Central America - A First Approach to Tort Liability in the Central American Civil Codes by Castro Valle, Claudia María
Journal of Civil Law Studies 
Volume 11 Number 1 Article 6 
11-29-2018 
Central America - A First Approach to Tort Liability in the Central 
American Civil Codes 
Claudia María Castro Valle 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls 
 Part of the Civil Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Claudia María Castro Valle, Central America - A First Approach to Tort Liability in the Central American 
Civil Codes, 11 J. Civ. L. Stud. (2018) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol11/iss1/6 
This Civil Law in the World is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu. 
 
 
A FIRST APPROACH TO TORT LIABILITY IN THE 
CENTRAL AMERICAN CIVIL CODES  
Claudia María Castro Valle∗ 
I. Introduction ............................................................................. 190 
II. The Characterization of Tort Liability in the                                    
Central American Civil Codes ............................................... 191 
III. The Nature of Tort Liability in Central America                                  
and its Application ................................................................. 192 
A. The Criteria for the Imputation of Tort Liability ............... 195 
B. Strict Liability in Central America ..................................... 199 
1. Vicarious Responsibility ................................................. 199 
2. Damages Caused by Animals ......................................... 201 
3. Acts of Things ................................................................. 201 
4. Unlawful Effects of Lawful Activities ............................ 204 
5. Abuse of Rights ............................................................... 206 
6. Available Defenses ......................................................... 208 
IV. The Effects of the Tort Liability Models Available                              
in the Central American Civil Codes ..................................... 212 
V. Conclusions ............................................................................ 214 
 
 
Keywords: civil law, tort liability, Central America, fault-based lia-
bility, strict liability  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 ∗   Dean of Graduate Studies of the Universidad Tecnológica Centroameri-
cana (UNITEC, Honduras), Bachelor’s Degree in Legal and Social Sciences (Uni-
versidad de San Pedro Sula, Honduras), Master’s Degree in Business Law 
(UNITEC, Honduras), Master’s Degree in Law, Business and Justice (Universitat 
de Valencia, Spain), and Doctorate in Legal Studies, Political Science and Crim-
inology (Universitat de Valencia, Spain). The author thanks the Center of Civil 
Law Studies at the Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center for 
having hosted a two-month research visit in spring 2017.  
190 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 11 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In order to achieve the proper protection of individual interests, 
tort rules need to be applied efficiently whenever these interests are 
subjected to any kind of harm. For that to be possible, the traditional 
approach has been the acceptance that any loss or injury sustained 
by legally protected interests must meet certain requirements. The 
requirements include the actual existence of specific regulation de-
signed for their legal protection, compensability, imputability to a 
person other than the victim, and certainty.1 Hence, tort is generated 
from the infringement of the general duty of respect due to any le-
gally protected interest.2 It is a non-contractual obligation imposed 
on a person, in order to compensate the holders of such interests, for 
any injuries or losses caused. These interests can be either material 
or moral.  
The primary requirement for the application of tort law is that 
the sustained damages, losses, or injuries must originate from a neg-
ligent or intentional activity or omission. This means that care and 
precaution were omitted in the execution of such activity, and that 
the causation between this activity and the harmful effects can be 
proved in a court of justice. However, tort liability is essentially pat-
rimonial. Its function is to grant, impede or repair a specific eco-
nomic loss,3 while its application allows the reparation of indirect 
patrimonial injuries and non-pecuniary damages.4 
                                                                                                             
 1. Naveira Zarra & Maita María, El evento dañoso, in DERECHO DE 
RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EXTRACONTRACTUAL 42 (José María Pena López ed., 
Cálamo 2004) [hereinafter RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EXTRACONTRACTUAL]. 
 2. José María Pena López, La responsabilidad civil extracontractual. El sis-
tema español de derecho de daños, in RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL 
EXTRACONTRACTUAL, supra note 1, at 17. 
 3. RAMÓN MARTÍN MATEO, 1 TRATADO DE DERECHO AMBIENTAL 173 (Tri-
vium 1991). 
 4. Tania García López, El principio de reparación del daño ambiental en el 
derecho internacional público. Una aproximación a su recepción por parte del 
derecho mexicano, 7 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 481, 
487-88 (2007). 
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The aim of this paper is to compare the way that tort liability is 
regulated in the Central American civil codes (Guatemala, El Salva-
dor, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama), understanding 
the similarities and differences in their approach. This sort of anal-
ysis could be the base of any harmonization effort, so relevant in the 
actual regional context, in view of the recent developments of the 
Central American economic integration process.  
II. THE CHARACTERIZATION OF TORT LIABILITY IN THE CENTRAL 
AMERICAN CIVIL CODES 
Much like in Europe (think of art. 1382 of the Napoleonic Code), 
in the Central American civil codes, the concept of tort ordinarily 
rests on a general clause imposing fault-based liability, though it is 
possible to identify among these civil codes some interesting varia-
tions. For example, only in Honduras (art. 2236) and Panama (art. 
1644) tort liability is characterized using elements such as: action or 
omission, fault or negligence, and obligation to compen-
sate. Whereas, Costa Rica (art.1045) and Nicaragua (art. 2509) add 
other elements to the characterization, such as fault and imprudence, 
and in the Nicaraguan text, the notion of malicious acts is also in-
cluded. The Salvadoran Civil Code (arts. 2065 and 2080) is rooted 
in the classic construction of delict, quasi-delict or fault, although it 
also adds features such as malice and negligence. The exception to 
this trend will be the Guatemalan Civil Code (art. 1645). Although 
it uses terms such as intention, carelessness or recklessness as defin-
ing criteria, this provision is not really describing a fault based lia-
bility model, because it contains a rebuttable presumption of fault or 
negligence. 
Another important feature of the tort liability models found in 
these codes is their obvious individual character. On the one hand, 
the interests that would be harmed according to the logic of the reg-
ulation are personal aspects of the individual, both material and 
moral. On the other hand, any claim regarding such losses or injuries 
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can only be made by the person who has suffered them.5 Addition-
ally, the tort liability models have a distinct economic quality, be-
cause in spite of the possibility of addressing moral injuries, their 
structures are decidedly patrimonial, both from the perspective of 
the damages and the compensation.6 
III. THE NATURE OF TORT LIABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND ITS 
APPLICATION 
Renowned legal experts have tried to explain the lawmakers’ in-
tentions based on the way they have regulated tort liabil-
ity. For Díez-Picazo the purpose of such legal institution is the dis-
tribution of misfortunes;7 for Pena López, the animus seems to be 
the social administration of harm.8 From these ideas one can gather 
that tort liability is not intended as a way to vanish the harm that the 
legally protected interests may suffer, but to transfer the loss to the 
person who caused it through compensation. In civil law, such a pur-
pose does not have a punitive nature, contrary to common law where 
concepts such as punitive damages turn tort liability into a form of 
sanction.9  
                                                                                                             
 5. Francisco De la Barra Gili, Responsabilidad extracontractual por daño 
ambiental: el problema de la legitimación activa, 29 REVISTA CHILENA DE 
DERECHO 367, 369 (2002). 
 6. Gisela María Pérez Fuentes, La responsabilidad civil por daños al medio 
ambiente en el derecho comparado, XXII PROLEGÓMENOS, DERECHOS Y 
VALORES 35, 36 (2009). 
 7. LUIS DÍEZ-PICAZO, DERECHO DE DAÑOS 41-42 (Civitas 1999). 
 8. Pena López, supra note 2, at 16. 
 9. In fact, one could discuss if the function of punitive damages is exclu-
sively punitive. The civilian doctrine has started to change its position towards 
them. It now refers to punitive damages as being a useful tool to ensure private 
enforcement and justice through the mechanisms available in private law. The 
newly found utility has to do with the fact that many times, according to the civil-
ian logic, the compensation granted through tort law is proportional to the loss 
suffered, this is not necessarily proportional to patrimonial profits obtained by the 
tortfeasor from such actions. This disproportion causes for the application of the 
civilian tort law to lose some of its effectiveness, by making it affordable for the 
wrongdoer to injure third parties. A solution such as punitive damages might 
strengthen the notion that tort law is an appropriate mechanism to enable individ-
uals to compensate for the institutional weakness of some governments to resolve 
certain type of conflicts, and the gap caused by certain principles of public law 
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Regarding their foundations, tort liability models tend to sub-
scribe to two ways of understanding and bringing to reality the con-
cept of justice: corrective justice and distributive justice. Distribu-
tive justice is invoked when laws are designed with the purpose of 
objectively allocating the burdens and benefits of dangerous or risky 
activities, whereas corrective justice tends to use rules that catego-
rize illicit activities, and they also tend to include notions such as 
compensation. The advantage offered by the distributive variant is 
that there is no need to focus exclusively on the contending parties 
(wrongdoer and victim) since it allows a much broader approach to 
the conflict and its possible solutions. Thus, the purpose of distribu-
tive justice is not to correct an error or injustice that has happened 
between two specific individuals. It aims to establish behaviors for 
private actors that are considered socially efficient.10 
Applying these criteria to the analysis of the Central American 
civil codes helps to realize that lawmakers have incorporated ele-
ments that are specific to corrective justice when designing tort lia-
bility models. All these civil codes refer in some way or another to 
the obligation to compensate for the injuries caused.11 In addition, 
the Salvadoran and Costa Rican Civil Codes also refer to the exist-
ence of liability generated from unlawful actions.12 
This does not mean that distributive justice is excluded from 
Central American private law. On the contrary, legal experts have 
already commented that the fact that a legal system recognizes cor-
                                                                                                             
such as the ultima ratio of criminal law. See Lotte Meurkens, The Punitive Dam-
ages Debate in Continental Europe: Food for Thought, in THE POWER OF 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: IS EUROPE MISSING OUT? 32-36 (Lotte Meurkens & Emily 
Nordin eds., Intersentia 2012). 
 10. LIESBETH ENNEKING, FOREIGN DIRECT LIABILITY AND BEYOND 546-47 
(Eleven 2012). 
 11. GUAT. CIV. CODE art. 1645; EL SAL. CIV. CODE art. 2065; HOND. CIV. 
CODE art. 2236; NICAR. CIV. CODE art. 2509; COSTA RICA CIV. CODE art. 1045; 
and PAN. CIV. CODE art. 1644. 
 12. EL SAL. CIV. CODE art 2065; and COSTA RICA CIV. CODE 1046. 
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rective justice is not an obstacle to the inclusion of distributive jus-
tice as well.13 Nevertheless, it is true that most legal systems of the 
Western Hemisphere tend to favor corrective justice through mone-
tary compensation.14  
The analysis of these legal systems shows that the Central Amer-
ican lawmakers agree with this ampler idea of a dual system because 
it is possible to identify in the civil codes features that correspond to 
both systems. For example, the incorporation of some elements such 
as the principle ubi emolumentum, ibi onus,15 also known as cuius 
commoda, eius incommode,16 is an indicator of using distributive 
justice as a guiding notion. Through this principle, the mere fact of 
obtaining any economic benefit from an action that harms third par-
ties is enough to constitute liability, even when the person who has 
carried out such action is not the one who benefits from them. An 
example of the application of this principle is the economic benefit 
obtained by the employer through the injuries caused by his em-
ployee. This principle is identifiable in all the civil codes of the re-
gion.17 Another principle that serves to incorporate distributive jus-
tice in a tort liability system is res ipsa loquitur. The latter will be 
addressed later.18 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 13. Hanoch Sheinman, Tort Law and Distributive Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 354-84 (John Oberdiek ed., Oxford U. Press 
2014). 
 14. Richard J. Peltz-Steele, Wrongs, Rights, and Remedies: A Yankee Romp 
in Recent European Tort Law, 26 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 102, 104 (2016). 
 15. Latin aphorism which translates as “the one who benefits from an activity 
has to bear the risk it originates.” 
 16. Fernando Reglero Campos, Capítulo II. Los sistemas de responsabilidad 
civil, in I TRATADO DE RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL 281 (5th ed., L. Fernando Reglero 
Campos & José Manuel Busto Lago eds., Thomson Reuters-Aranzadi 2014) 
[hereinafter TRATADO DE RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL]. 
 17. GUAT. CIV. CODE arts.1662, 1672; EL SAL. CIV. CODE art. 2073; HOND. 
CIV. CODE art. 2241; NICAR. CIV. CODE art. 2514; COSTA RICA CIV. CODE art. 
1048; and PAN. CIV. CODE art. 1650. 
 18. See infra, Part. III. B.3. Acts of Things. 
2018] CENTRAL AMERICA 195 
 
 
 
A. The Criteria for the Imputation of Tort Liability 
As previously stated, corrective justice is usually manifested 
through fault and negligence based liability models, constituting a 
more traditional and voluntarist version of tort liability.19 Correc-
tive justice focuses on the behavior of the person that has caused the 
harm, whether the person has complied with the usual level of dili-
gence imposed by law, while reproaching some specific behaviors.20 
It is possible for some legal systems to have additional require-
ments for the configuration of these types of liability, such as the 
duty of care, for example, or the existence of lack of foreseeability 
and prudence. It is also possible for legal systems to restrict the 
scope of tort liability, limiting its application to personal injuries or 
property damages.21 Such diversity of subjective criteria has been 
the cause of extensive doctrinal debates in other parts of the world, 
aiming to establish their actual suitability in relation to certain types 
of injuries. 
Peña López discusses the test of predictability or avoidability of 
harm, explaining that negligence can be established from foreseea-
ble or avoidable harm even when due diligence has been applied. 
This entails that exoneration will be available if it is possible to 
demonstrate that such harm is unpredictable and inevitable.22 It 
means that one must exercise the utmost diligence to ensure that no 
injury is caused because otherwise, getting rid of the imputation will 
                                                                                                             
 19. When analyzing the concept of negligence, it is necessary to stop for a 
moment and focus on its standard of care, which is crucial to understand the ade-
quacy of the rules governing it. These rules should pinpoint the standard of care 
that needs to be taken by the potential tortfeasor in order to avoid liability entirely. 
Therefore, taking the necessary care to avoid harm, also avoids compensation. See 
MICHAEL FAURE, DETERRENCE, INSURABILITY, AND COMPENSATION IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY—FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
22 (Springer 2003). 
 20. Fernando Peña López, El criterio de imputación (I. Generalidades), in 
RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EXTRACONTRACTUAL, supra note 1, at 102. 
 21. Cees Van Dam, European Tort Law: Features of a Diverse Landscape, 
in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO EUROPEAN UNION PRIVATE LAW 167-68 
(Christian Twigg-Flesner ed., Cambridge U. Press 2010). 
 22. Fernando Peña López, El criterio de imputación (II. La Culpabilidad), in 
RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EXTRACONTRACTUAL, supra note 1, at 119. 
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be almost impossible. Interestingly, Cabanillas Sánchez suggests 
that when the required level of diligence is much more rigorous than 
usual, the objectification of tort liability occurs.23 
The objectification of tort liability starts by including pseudo-
objective imputation criteria in civil codes. Examples are rebuttable 
presumptions regarding the existence of fault or the exhaustion of 
due diligence.24 In European law, an example of such regulation is 
section 836 of the German BGB25 that imposes a rebuttable pre-
sumption of fault on the owner of buildings that when collapsing can 
harm third parties or their property, allowing the defendant to be 
exonerated if demonstrating having acted diligently to avoid such 
harm.26 
In the Central American civil codes, the use of rebuttable pre-
sumptions is very similar to the German model. Here pseudo-objec-
tive criteria are used to define liability for the acts of others.27 How-
ever, in art. 1648 of the Guatemalan Civil Code it is possible to ob-
serve a different and much broader example, since the rebuttable 
presumption of fault is not limited to such specific cases. In this 
model, the presumption of fault is general. Regardless of the case, 
in order to have the right to compensation, the harmed party is only 
required to prove the existence of an injury or a loss and not the 
wrongdoer’s fault.28 
                                                                                                             
 23. Antonio Cabanillas Sánchez, El daño ambiental, REVISTA DE DERECHO 
AMBIENTAL 9, 13 (1994). 
 24. Pena López, supra note 2, at 26. 
 25. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code], as promulgated on 
Jan. 2, 2002 (BGB1 I, p. 42, 2909; 2003 I page 738), § 836. 
 26. Franz Werro, Liability for Harm Caused by Things, in TOWARDS A 
EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 925-26 (4th ed., Arthur S. Hartkamp, Martijn W. Hes-
selink, Ewoud Hondius, Chantal Mak, & Edgar du Perron eds., Kluwer 2011) 
[hereinafter TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE]. 
 27. EL SAL. CIV. CODE art. 2073; HOND. CIV. CODE art. 2237; NICAR. CIV. 
CODE art. 2512; COSTA RICA CIV. CODE art. 1048; and PAN. CIV. CODE art. 1645. 
 28. The Civil Chamber of the Guatemalan Supreme Court of Justice has ruled 
on the matter in Nov. 28, 2007, stating that such a rule establishes the right of the 
defendant to contribute to the evidentiary process in order to weaken the presumed 
fault, but a correlative right is recognized to the plaintiff, who is only required to 
prove the existence of an injury, but not the defendant’s fault. See Ruling of the 
Civil Chamber of Nov. 28, 2007 (Sentencia [S.] No. 462-2006, Nov. 28, 2007, 
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Pseudo-objectification of this sort of imputation criteria can also 
be found in the way that harm caused by animals is regulated. Both 
the Salvadorian Civil Code (art. 2077) and the Nicaraguan Civil 
Code (art. 2513) impute liability to the owner or the mere holder of 
the animal. But in the case of stray animals, animals that have been 
released, or animals that have fled, in order to impute liability, the 
owner or the holder should be responsible for releasing the animal 
or letting it escape previously to the occurrence of the harm object 
of the claim. 
A third possibility of pseudo-objectification is offered by the in-
juries caused by the acts of things. In the Salvadoran Civil Code (art. 
2079), liability for injuries caused by a thing that falls or is thrown 
from the top of a building is imputable to anyone who inhabits that 
part of the building, unless it is proven that the deed was exclusively 
carried out by someone in a faulty or fraudulent manner. 
The appearance of these pseudo-objective criteria is indeed a re-
flection of the limited scope and anachronism of fault-based liability 
in the actual state of things. Fault-based liability corresponds to a 
reality that was typical of the nineteenth century or in preindustrial 
societies. Undoubtedly, the advent of industrialization has forced 
the revision of the system that has been put in place in order to as-
sure the distribution of losses, thus, contemplating the possibility of 
including objective criteria instead. 
This process of objectification certainly did not stop there. Strict 
liability regimes based on risk are available to date. They are a con-
sequence of searching for possible alternatives to the traditional ci-
vilian mechanisms, due to a general understanding of the benefits 
that certain modern technologies bring to the community, and avoid-
ing the need to resort to their prohibition. As a doctrine, strict liabil-
ity positively reflects the spirit of sustainable development. 
                                                                                                             
GACETA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA [Gazette of the Supreme Court of 
Justice], Clase Civil). 
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Objective imputation criteria are used to determine the liability 
of the wrongdoer of harmful actions or omissions, when these con-
vey risks for others, regardless of whether or not there has been fault 
on their part; or, in the case of negligent behavior, to determine if 
the transgressor has acted with the maximum degree of care or not. 
These criteria are based on the agent’s activity and not on its behav-
ior, by focusing instead on the victim’s due protection.29 The logic 
used assumes that such activity is abnormal or extraordinary, and 
therefore it cannot be safely developed, despite the degree of dili-
gence used.30 
If economic analysis is added to the mix, it is possible to con-
clude that when strict liability is applied, the burden of suffering all 
the social costs of the loss or injury therewith imposed on the tort-
feasor has a precautionary effect. This is achieved by forcing the 
potential wrongdoer to take all the needed safeguards in order to 
bring his activity closer to the optimal level of care (sometimes even 
above the required level), with the objective of minimizing the ex-
pected costs.31 
The fact that it is increasingly common to find strict liability 
rules in the Central American civil codes speaks of a new under-
standing of tort liability, which tends to socialize the economic 
losses increasingly. This aims at improving the position of the vic-
tims, by balancing their interests with those of the wrongdo-
ers,32 while also balancing the distribution of losses caused, without 
                                                                                                             
 29. Roberto Paulino de Albuquerque Júnior, Notas sobre a Teoria da respon-
sabilidade Civil sem dano, 6 REVISTA DE DIREITO CIVIL CONTEMPORÂNEO 89, 90 
(2016). 
 30. Agustín Viguri Perea, La responsabilidad civil por inmisiones, in III 
CONFERENCIAS SOBRE EL MEDIO AMBIENTE. MUNICIPIO Y URBANISMO 115 
(Agustín Viguri Perea ed., Comité Econòmic i Social de la Comunitat Valenciana 
2000). 
 31. FAURE, supra note 19, at 22. 
 32. NICOLAS ROUILLER, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW—AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND TO THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
OF BUSINESS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 426 (Schulthess 2015). 
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implying an extra effort from society in general when trying to avoid 
harm.33 Without a doubt this is a “win-win” solution. 
B. Strict Liability in Central America 
1. Vicarious Responsibility 
Strict liability usually extends to cases dealing with vicarious li-
ability. Some examples are the employer’s liability for the actions 
of its employees,34 or the CEO’s liability for business activi-
ties.35 The modern theory of vicarious liability is not based on fault, 
but on political and social considerations, as commented by Kodil-
inye.36 This change is linked to the obvious unfairness and the fact 
that it is legally unjustifiable for a person who has not committed 
any fault to be responsible for another’s harmful behavior. In reality, 
it is possible to argue that a person who employs others in order to 
advance his or her own interests, especially if these are economic, 
should be held liable for any harm caused by the actions of such 
employees. Simultaneously, it can also be argued that the innocent 
victim must be able to sue someone who is financially capable of 
responding for that loss.  
In Central America, this form of strict liability is present in Gua-
temala (arts.1663 and 1664) and in Costa Rica (art. 1048).37 The 
logic used is that applying strict liability should derive from the pos-
sibility of obtaining economic profit. In other words, strict liability 
                                                                                                             
 33. JOHN M. CHURCH, WILLIAM R. CORBETT, THOMAS E. RICHARD, & JOHN 
V. WHITE, TORT LAW, THE AMERICAN AND LOUISIANA PERSPECTIVES 7 
(Vandeplas Publishing 2008). 
 34. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.][CIVIL CODE] art. 1242, §5 (Fr.). See Reglero Cam-
pos, supra note 16, at 286. 
 35. BGB section 31 (Ger.); Gerhard Wagner, Vicarious Liability, in 
TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 26, at 912-13. 
 36. GILBERT KODILINYE, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN TORT LAW 334 (5th 
ed., Routledge 2015). 
 37. In the case of Costa Rica, the lawmakers provided two different systems 
in this article, COSTA RICA CIV. CODE art. 1048, (1) pseudo-strict liability, by in-
cluding a rebuttable presumption of fault, and (2) strict liability in the case of 
hazardous activities. See VÍCTOR PÉREZ VARGAS, DERECHO PRIVADO 563-72 (4th 
ed., Litografía e Imprenta Lil 2013). 
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rules should be linked with the principle ubi emolumentum, ibi onus, 
by means of which, the simple fact of obtaining an economic benefit 
through an action that harms third parties in any way, is enough 
cause for making the employer liable. 
In Guatemala (art. 1665)38 and Panama (art. 1645), vicarious li-
ability also extends to the state, which may be liable for any harm 
caused by public servants in the exercise of their duties. This is an 
example of fault in vigilando. However, only in Guatemala it is pos-
sible to find true strict liability, because in the Panamanian case, 
fault or negligence are required. In Honduras (art. 2237) vicarious 
liability is limited to any harm caused by a special agent acting in 
the name of the state, and not for public servants exercising their 
duties. In this case, they are solely responsible for their actions. In 
the case of Costa Rica (art. 1048), there is no specific mention of 
vicarious liability in the case of the state, but the general clause 
available could be applied.  
In these jurisdictions, the strict vicarious liability of the state is 
construed as joint liability. This approach is available in Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Costa Rica. In Guatemala, Constitutional art. 155 es-
tablishes joint liability on the part of the state or the state institutions 
where the wrongdoer is employed. This liability is further clarified 
in the Civil Code, through a strict liability regime. In Honduras, art. 
2238 establishes a joint liability regime. In the case of Costa Rica, 
art. 1048 contains a general clause for joint liability. It is possible to 
assume that it could be also applied to the state.  
                                                                                                             
 38. GUAT. CIV. CODE art. 1665, originally, this article stated that such liabil-
ity was subsidiary. However, it was amended by the Constitution through its art. 
155. From then on, this became a joint liability, and it has a statute of limitation 
of twenty years. Moreover, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court, in a judgment 
of Dec. 6, 2004, said that in such cases the “jointness” attached to this form of 
liability is passive, giving the claimant a faculty of choice, having the possibility 
of targeting either, or if it is more convenient for his need, targeting both simulta-
neously. Nonetheless, it is understood that if the claim is directed against only one 
of them, it should entail the possibility of entirely covering the cost of compensa-
tion. 
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Costa Rican jurisprudence has also indicated that the state and 
its agencies shall be liable for all the losses caused by their opera-
tions, whether they are legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnor-
mal. The only exceptions allowed are force majeure, contributory 
negligence, or an action of a third party. It establishes requirements 
such as that the activity is actually generated from the state, that at 
least adequate causality can be established, the existence of a com-
pensable loss or harm, and that the loss or injuries should be unlaw-
ful, true, effective, real, evaluable, and individualizable.39 
2. Damages Caused by Animals 
A second example of strict liability is the one allocated on the 
owners or keepers of animals that cause any kind of damage. This is 
regulated in art. 1669 of the Guatemalan Civil Code. This form of 
liability is definitely strict because it reaches the owner, even if the 
animal was stray or had escaped without the owner’s fault. The only 
exception admitted is the provocation or fault of the victim. The 
Honduran and Panamanian Civil Codes include similar regula-
tions.40 In both cases, liability is also strict, but besides allowing 
contributory negligence as a defense, these codes also allow the use 
of casus fortuitus or fortuitous event. 
3. Acts of Things 
Strict liability for the act of things is a third example.41 It relates 
to those cases where the head of the family is strictly liable for the 
                                                                                                             
 39. Judgements of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala Primera [First Cham-
ber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica], no. 025-F-99, Jan. 22, 1999 
and no. 589-F-99, Oct. 1, 1999; and Judgment of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, 
Sala Tercera [Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica], no. 
252-F-01, Mar. 28, 2001. 
 40. HOND. CIV. CODE art. 2239; PAN. CIV. CODE art. 1647. 
 41. The act of things has been included in the French Civil Code, C. CIV. art. 
1244, as well as in the Spanish Civil Code, CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 1910. See 
Werro, supra note 26, at 925-27; Ordonnance 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant 
réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations 
[Ordinance no. 2016-131 of Feb. 10, 2016 on the Reform of Contract Law, the 
General Scheme and Proof of Obligations], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
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damages caused by the things that fall or are thrown from the house 
in which the family lives.42 In Central America, the regulation re-
garding this type of liability also follows this logic, but in some cases 
it has been extended to the damages caused by the ruin or collapse 
of a building. The Guatemalan Civil Code (art. 1671) includes a 
strict liability solution. It states that the owner is unconditionally li-
able, adding the possibility of joint liability for the constructor, if the 
harm originates from a construction defect. The Panamanian Civil 
Code (art. 1652) also uses strict liability, by making liable the head 
of the family who lives in a building or part of it. The Salvadoran 
Civil Code (art. 935) establishes that if a building falls because of 
its bad condition, and thereby the neighbors are harmed in any way, 
the caused injuries must be compensated, except in the instance of a 
fortuitous event. 
It is also widely recognized by legal authors that numerals 2 and 
4 of art. 1908 of the Spanish Civil Code, which refer to the damage 
caused by excessive smoke and by infectious materials, regulate a 
sort of strict liability. It is noteworthy that some legal authors (fewer, 
perhaps) also acknowledge that numerals 1 and 3 of that same article 
regulate cases of strict liability as well. These numerals refer to the 
explosion of machines, inflammation of explosive substances, and 
falling of trees.43 This type of liability is also regulated in some Cen-
tral American civil codes. In Honduras (art. 2241) and Panama (art. 
1650), the wording is almost identical, and in Guatemala (art. 1672) 
the wording has some minor changes. 
According to the legal doctrine, the notion of liability for the acts 
of things follows the principle res ipsa loquitur, since the damages 
caused to the neighboring estates are a result of the owner’s lack of 
                                                                                                             
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Feb. 10, 2016, 
No. 0035, NOR: JUSC1522466R; Royal Decree of July 24, 1889 (Real Decreto 
(R.D.), B.O.E 1889, 206) (Spain). 
 42. Reglero Campos, supra note 16, at 286. 
 43. Luis Martínez Vázquez de Castro, La protección civil del medio am-
biente, in PRIMERAS CONFERENCIAS SOBRE EL MEDIO AMBIENTE 10 (Agustín Vi-
guri Perea ed., Comité Econòmic i Social de la Comunitat Valenciana 1999). 
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care. The principle res ipsa loquitur corresponds to a technique 
based on prima facie evidence, which serves to reduce the uncer-
tainty generated by the obligation of proving the causal link, which 
sometimes could be a real obstacle in order to achieve the complete 
and total compensation of the victim. Prima facie evidence can be 
identified under different names in different legal systems, such as 
Anscheinsbeweis der Kausalität in Germany or causalité virtuelle in 
France.44 
Some of these legal authors argue that applying this principle 
implies recognizing a form of strict liability based on negligence. In 
this case it is enough to demonstrate the existence of actual danger-
ousness unlike with fault based liability.45 However, it is worth 
mentioning that there are other authors who point out that liability 
based on res ipsa loquitur is not really strict, because the effect is 
only the reversal of the burden of proof. In those cases, the defendant 
still has the option of proving that his behavior was neither negligent 
nor faulty.46 If this doctrinal position is assumed as correct, one 
could not speak of a true form of strict liability, but of a pseudo-
objectification of liability. Although viewed from a purely eco-
nomic perspective, the effect is rather similar, since both negligence 
and strict liability induce risky actors to assume those precautions 
for which the cost is justifiable.47 Regardless, if only the wording of 
these provisions is taken into account, it is evident that the lawmak-
ers did not resort to the use of rebuttable presumptions. They actu-
ally deem the wrongdoer as liable in all the cases. 
                                                                                                             
 44. Fernando Reglero Campos & Luis Medina Alcoz, Capítulo V. El nexo 
causal. La pérdida de oportunidad. Las causas de exoneración de responsabili-
dad: culpa de la víctima y fuerza mayor, in I TRATADO DE RESPONSABILIDAD 
CIVIL, supra note 16, at 859. 
 45. JAVIER TAMAYO JARAMILLO, I DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL 5 (Temis 
1986). 
 46. KODILINYE, supra note 36, at 99. 
 47. Mark A. Geistfeld, Fault Lines in the Positive Economic Analysis of Tort 
Law, in 1 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 157 (Arlen Jen-
nifer ed., Edward Elgar 2013). 
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 4. Unlawful Effects of Lawful Activities 
The Costa Rican Supreme Court of Justice has pointed out that, 
historically, the notion of liability for lawful activities has been a 
prevailing criterion for applying strict liability. The court states that 
it should not be the victim’s responsibility to prove the causal link 
between the tortious action and the sustained injuries or losses, when 
the tortfeasor has assumed the risk knowingly, by deciding to carry 
out a risky activity, even when the activity is a lawful one, contrary 
to what is expected to happen when dealing with fault-based liabil-
ity.48 This position has been reaffirmed by the Costa Rican High 
Court of Criminal Cassation in a judgement referring to the civil li-
ability resulting from the commission of a crime.49 Moreover, strict 
liability for the unlawful effects of lawful acts, is also applicable to 
the state and its agents, as it has been referred to by the Constitu-
tional Chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court of Justice.50 This 
opinion goes hand in hand with the recognition that this legal system 
makes of the abuse of rights doctrine in art. 22 of the Costa Rican 
Civil Code. 
Even though it is not expressly mentioned in the aforementioned 
rulings, it is easy to deduce that the opinions are based on the notion 
                                                                                                             
 48. Judgement of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala Primera [Supreme 
Court of Justice of Costa Rica, First Chamber], no. 398, June 6, 2001. 
 49. The High Court of Criminal Cassation has said that the foundation of 
strict liability is the social recognition that certain activities, while being legiti-
mate and necessary for the actual social and technological development, concom-
itantly are risky and possibly tortious. In those cases, the risk should not be as-
sumed by the one suffering the effects, but rather by the one obtaining any kind 
of benefit from such activity. See Judgment of the Tribunal Superior de Casación 
Penal [Superior Tribunal of Criminal Cassation of Costa Rica], no. 493-2004, 
May 20, 2004. 
 50. The Constitutional Chamber has stated that some fundamental rights, 
such as the right to a clean environment, may impose some limits on the scope of 
the state’s activity. These are limits that need to be considered and established 
because of the role of the state. A role that includes a mandate to guarantee, de-
fend, and preserve those rights. Therefore, the state has the obligation of omitting 
some of its own interventions, even if they are lawful, especially when their fore-
seeable results may harm in any way fundamental rights recognized by the Con-
stitution. See Ruling of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala Constitutional [Su-
preme Court of Justice of Costa Rica, Constitutional Chamber] no. 3248-2002,  
Apr. 9, 2002. 
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of unlawfulness of the effects of lawful conducts, understanding that 
even if a behavior is lawful, it may cause damages to third parties,51 
affecting subjective rights or legally protected interests. In this case, 
the causation of such damages is what is deemed unlawful or ille-
gal. This qualification is to be achieved when the duty of care is not 
met, putting legally protected interests at risk.52 Unlawfulness, as a 
presupposition of tort liability, implies not only a kind of objectifi-
cation, but the recognition that the lives of others can be negatively 
affected by the decisions that a person may take, even when this 
person is legally enabled by rules that have not been analyzed 
properly.53 
This is one argument in favor of the need of readjusting the reg-
ulations regarding tort liability in the civil codes of Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama,54 because it is obvious 
that the lawmakers of the region did not include the concept of lia-
bility for lawful acts, contrary to what happens in Costa Rica, where 
this form of liability has been introduced in art. 1043. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 51. Rivero Sánchez says that the liability for lawful act is a general principle 
of law under which even when a behavior is authorized by the law, but it causes 
harm of some kind, it must be accompanied by an adequate scheme of compensa-
tion for the damages caused. See JUAN MARCOS RIVERO SÁNCHEZ, III 
RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL 61 (2d ed., Biblioteca Jurídica Diké 2001). 
 52. Guilherme Henrique Lima Reinig, Abuso de direito e responsabilidade 
por ato ilícito: críticas ao enunciado 37 da 1.a Jornada de Direito Civil, 7 
REVISTA DE DIREITO CIVIL CONTEMPORÂNEO 61, 87 (2016). 
 53. David Howarth, The General Conditions of Unlawfulness, in TOWARDS 
A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 26, at 874-81. 
 54. While it is true that Title VI of the Guatemalan Civil Code is called “Ob-
ligations derived from lawful acts without previous agreement,” the lawmakers 
opted for a numerus clausus system, leaving out a general rule that could govern 
atypical situations. In the case of Honduras and Panama, lawmakers included gen-
eral concepts related to quasi contracts in the Civil Code, but not a general rule 
regarding liability for lawful acts. In Nicaragua, even though the wording of art. 
2507 of the Civil Code is almost identical to that of art. 1043 of the Costa Rican 
Civil Code, it only refers to liability for lawful acts, when they affect individuals 
that presumably have consented to them. 
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5. Abuse of Rights 
 The abuse of rights is regulated in almost all the Central Ameri-
can civil codes. Jordá Capitán is of the opinion that this doctrine 
represents a rupture from the Roman Law principle of qui iure suo 
utitur neminem laedit, by which it was understood that the exercise 
of one’s legal rights could not cause harm to another.55 Brazilian 
legal doctrine has actually described it as another form of strict lia-
bility, attending to its finalist nature, and seeing it as totally inde-
pendent from fault, and perfectly useful as legal basis for an inhibi-
tory action.56 
Art. 1653 of the Guatemalan Civil Code regulates the abuse of 
rights in the section dealing with tort liability. According to this ar-
ticle, the legitimacy of any right is limited by the notions of bad faith 
and excess—extremes that need to be proved in court. According to 
the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in this country, 
the test for bad faith and excess has to be based on the idea that the 
exercise of one’s rights always has to have the purpose of defending 
legally protected interests.57  
In the case of the Costa Rican Civil Code, the abuse of rights is 
regulated in art. 22. This article states that the law does not protect 
the abuse of rights or their antisocial exercise. Any act or omission 
in a contract that clearly exceeds the normal limits of the exercise of 
a right, thus causing harm to third parties or to the counterparty, will 
lead to the corresponding compensation and the adoption of judicial 
or administrative measures in order to prevent the persistence of 
such abuse. The wording used is rather unfortunate because it limits 
its application exclusively to contractual liability cases. 
                                                                                                             
 55. EVA JORDÁ CAPITÁN, EL DERECHO A UN MEDIO AMBIENTE ADECUADO 
268-69 (Aranzadi 2002). 
 56. Reining, supra note 52, at 64-66. 
 57. Ruling of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, Clase Civil, [Supreme Court of 
Justice of Guatemala, Civil Chamber], no. 141-2000, Feb. 26, 2001, GACETA DE 
LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA [Gazette of the Supreme Court of Justice]. 
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 In neither Honduras, El Salvador, nor Nicaragua has the abuse 
of rights been regulated yet. However, the Nicaraguan Supreme 
Court of Justice has referred to the doctrine of abuse of rights in a 
ruling of June 12, 1948 (Judicial Bulletin 14281), noting that the 
principle nemo damnum facit qui suo jure utitur58 cannot be applied 
in an absolute manner because it would lead to many abuses, espe-
cially when someone acts with recklessness or in bad faith, damag-
ing others. That is why jurisprudence has attenuated the rigor of the 
principle, meaning that, nowadays, no liability is possible when 
one’s rights have been used with prudence and in good faith. Esco-
bar Fornos also comments that in regards to Nicaragua, this doctrine 
should only be applicable when dealing with fault-based liability, 
since without fraud or fault there will be no abuse.59 
This position coincides with Von Bar’s. He explains that in legal 
systems that do not have special provisions in relation to the abuse 
of rights, they can perfectly operate under a general clause for fault 
based liability because it is enough to have the concept of fault in-
cluded in the regulation. Nevertheless, the clause of abuse rights is 
an advantage because it serves to dissolve the perception of subjec-
tive rights being absolute, which could be understood as a form of 
impunity for their holders.60 
 In Panama, this principle is not regulated yet, but it has been 
addressed in judgment no. 484-2007, July 24, 2008. There, it was 
ruled that this doctrine arises from the need to affirm the existence 
of subjective rights and the care that is needed to avoid the excesses 
that may emerge when they are exercised in such a way that they do 
not become unfair. In order to consider the exercise of a right as 
                                                                                                             
 58. Latin maxim that can be translated as: no one can cause any harm when 
exercising their right. 
 59. Escobar Fornos indicates some examples where it could be inferred, such 
as in the case of the resignation of the partners in a company of limited duration, 
in the obligations concerning an agent after his resignation, or in the obligations 
concerning the cohabitation of the spouses. See IVÁN ESCOBAR FORNOS, II 
DERECHO DE OBLIGACIONES 252-56 (Imprenta UCA 1989). 
 60. CHRISTIAN VON BAR, I THE COMMON EUROPEAN LAW OF TORTS 56-57 
(Oxford U. Press 1998). 
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abusive, its effects should be contrary to the economic and social 
aims of the law, which can be equated with the interests of the state 
itself.    
6. Available Defenses 
Liability models usually require some flexibility in order to ac-
commodate to the specific circumstances of the deeds generating 
losses or injuries. Therefore, it is normal for them to include some 
kind of exemptions or mitigating circumstances. Oftentimes, their 
availability depends on the type of liability the model is dealing with 
because they could be different for fault-based liability and for strict 
liability. The available exceptions normally are: (1) fortuitous event, 
(2) force majeure, (3) contributory negligence, (4) necessity, and (5) 
statute of limitations. 
In order to understand their scope, the first three need to be dis-
cussed simultaneously. Fortuitous event refers to statistically unpre-
dictable events and is applicable both in fault based liability and 
strict liability.61 Force majeure could also be used in both cases and 
refers to unavoidable events. This defense can be used to determine 
if a harmful action actually could be imputed to the alleged tortfea-
sor for carrying it out voluntarily, since it makes no sense to consider 
a person as liable if they could not influence the inflicted risk.62  
The notion of contributory negligence implies that the faulty 
negligent behavior is actually caused by the victim who is, partially 
or totally, responsible for triggering the losses or injuries affecting 
him. Its application is in no way connected to the existence of an 
outstanding obligation owed by the victim to the wrongdoer. It 
should be enough to prove that the individual suffering the damages 
did not apply reasonable care, therefore contributing to his own 
harm.63 Compensation should be reduced proportionally, and in 
                                                                                                             
 61. Reglero Campos & Medina Alcoz, supra note 44, at 895. 
 62. FAURE, supra note 19, at 53. 
 63. NATALIE PERSADIE & RAJENDRA RAMLOGAN, COMMONWEALTH 
CARIBBEAN BUSINESS LAW 264-65 (3d ed., Routledge 2016). 
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some cases even denied, depending on the weight of the contribution 
that the victim’s faulty or negligent action represents in relation to 
the effect suffered. Some behaviors that could be considered as con-
tributory negligence are the lack of care, renouncing to implemen-
tation of preventive measures, refraining from reacting, reacting 
weakly, reacting excessively, refusing to mitigate the effects of the 
inflicted losses or injuries, accepting the losses or injuries (volenti 
non fit injuria), or assuming unnecessary risks.64  
Article 34-D from the Panamanian Civil Code is the only one 
available in the region that recognizes the differences between for-
tuitous event and force majeure. It establishes that a fortuitous event 
implies the occurrence of unpredictable natural events, and that 
force majeure is caused by irresistible human deeds. However, alt-
hough legal doctrine has clearly instituted the differences between 
these two defenses, it is still possible to find legal systems in Central 
America where these are used indiscriminately as if they were syn-
onyms. This is the case of art. 43 of the Salvadorian Civil Code.65 
This is also the case of art. 2512 from the Nicaraguan Civil Code, 
regarding vicarious liability. In this specific case, the wrongdoer is 
not considered liable if it is possible to prove that it was not in his 
reach to impede the harmful act, by having common and ordinary 
care or watchfulness. It is also important to note that although the 
                                                                                                             
 64. ROUILLER, supra note 32, at 433-37. 
 65. It is noteworthy that the Salvadoran case law, while recognizing the es-
tablished doctrinal differences between these two defenses, continues to maintain 
as valid the original wording used by the lawmakers, where they are incorporated 
as equivalent, stating as a justification that their practical effects are the same, and 
that both defenses are different expressions of a general category called “Just 
Cause.” This case law has also established its basic requirements: (a) that the 
harmful act is beyond the control of the alleging party, (b) that the harmful act is 
unforeseen and insurmountable, and (c) that its consequence is a permanent ina-
bility to perform an obligation. See Judgment of the Cámara Segunda de lo Civil 
de la Primera Sección Del Centro, San Salvador [Second Civil Chamber of the 
First Section of the Center of San Salvador] no. 14-2MC-14-A, Nov. 26, 2014; 
Judgment of the Cámara de la Tercera Sección del Centro, San Vicente [Chamber 
of the Third Section of the Center, San Vicente], no. C-05-PC-2015-CPCM, Feb. 
16, 2015; and Judgment of the Cámara de la Segunda Sección de Occidente, Son-
sonate [Chamber of the Second Section of the West, Sonsonate], no. INC-15-
CPCM-2015, June 9, 2015. 
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defense of fortuitous event is available in all these legal systems, 
courts and legal experts seem to prefer the use of force majeure66 
and contributory negligence instead.67 
The use of force majeure in the case of strict liability in Central 
America is very limited, following the notion posed by legal doc-
trine that in such cases, one should resort to the use of fortuitous 
event as a defense.68 Force majeure is available in Guatemala (art. 
1672), Honduras (art. 2241), and Panama (art. 1650) in the case of 
strict liability that originates from the fall of a tree.  
In most of the other legal systems of this region, force majeure 
is used as a defense in the case of liability for damage caused by 
animals, according to art. 2239 from the Honduran Civil Code, art. 
2513 from the Nicaraguan Civil Code, and art. 1647 from the Pana-
manian Civil Code. It is also used in the case of liability for damage 
caused by motive machinery, imposed on the person who benefits 
from it, as it is regulated in art. 1048 of the Costa Rican Civil Code. 
In the case of art. 1650 of the Guatemalan Civil Code, force majeure 
is regulated as a defense for the liability originated from the use of 
machinery, appliances, and dangerous substances.  
More or less, the same happens in the case of contributory neg-
ligence. Only art. 1645 from the Guatemalan Civil Code actually 
                                                                                                             
 66. In the Judgment of the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, II Cir-
cuito Judicial de San José [Criminal Court of Appeals, II Judicial Circuit of San 
José], no. 00418, May 15, 2003, the Court said that while it is true that there is a 
tendency to equate force majeure with the fortuitous events, because of their al-
most identical effects, the Costa Rican civil jurisprudence, since 1942, has made 
distinctions between the two defenses. It has argued that such differentiation was 
incorporated by the lawmaker, who sought important to establish strict liability in 
the event of unforeseen circumstances resulting from the normal development of 
the activity and risk created, and not in the case of force majeure, because in this 
case, forces different from the risk operate. Hence, the difference between the 
strict liability based on a fortuitous event and fault-based liability is predictability, 
because in the first case damage is unpredictable, something that is not possible 
when dealing with fault. These two defenses can also be differentiated upon their 
effects, since force majeure frees from liability in every case, because of its ex-
ternal origin. 
 67. Reglero explains that one of the characteristics of faultless liability, for 
example, is precisely the reduced number and scope of the available defenses. See 
Reglero Campos, supra note 16, at 309. 
 68. Van Dam, supra note 21, at 168. 
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includes it, as a general defense for any kind of tort liability. Central 
American lawmakers have also allowed the use of contributory neg-
ligence as a defense against the employer’s vicarious liability, fol-
lowing the French model.  
In the case of necessity, it presupposes that damages to legally 
protected interests have occurred when the victim of an unjustified 
attack tries to defend himself. In order to use this defense, the dam-
age caused has to be proportional to the attack suffered. Following 
this logic, it becomes obvious that the real problem behind using this 
solution lies in the possibility of determining a valid hierarchy for 
the legally protected interests. Art. 1658 of the Guatemalan Civil 
Code uses necessity when the wrongdoer is trying to protect himself 
or a third party from imminent danger. The effect in this case is to 
transform the unlawful action causing the losses or injuries into a 
lawful one. Besides this sole example, the Guatemalan Civil Code 
actually considers that a state of necessity is insufficient to exempt 
the perpetrator from his liability.    
Extinctive prescription (statute of limitation) is probably the 
most radical of all the defenses analyzed in this section due to its 
paralyzing effect.69 Once the period set by law has elapsed, be it 
after the harmful action has occurred or once its effects have been 
suffered by the victim, any claim for recovery becomes impossible. 
Guatemala offers two different statutory periods: a general 
timeframe of one year (art. 1673), and a special timeframe of twenty 
years in the case of the state’s vicarious liability for the acts of public 
servants (regulated by the Constitution). In Panama (art. 1706), the 
timeframe is one year for fault based or negligence based liability 
claims. In this case, the statutory period starts from the moment the 
victim realizes there has been a loss or injury. This can be interpreted 
as the moment when the effects are known.  
The Honduran and Nicaraguan Civil Codes are not as specific as 
the Guatemalan and Panamanian counterparts regarding this topic. 
                                                                                                             
 69. ROUILLER, supra note 32, at 432. 
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In Honduras (art. 297) and in Nicaragua (art. 924), the Civil Codes 
establish that the statute of limitations starts the day the claim could 
be filed. The wording is rather imprecise; nevertheless, the interpre-
tation should be similar to the one suggested in the case of Panama, 
meaning that it starts the moment the effects are known. In El Sal-
vador (art. 2254) and Costa Rica (art. 868), the Civil Codes incor-
porate general statutes of limitations. In the first, the statutory period 
included in the general regime is of ten years for civil actions based 
on executable titles and of twenty years for ordinary civil actions; in 
the latter, the period is of ten years for all cases.      
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE TORT LIABILITY MODELS AVAILABLE IN 
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CIVIL CODES 
As it was mentioned before, in addition to prevention, deterrence 
is a foreseeable effect of tort liability systems. It originates from the 
obligation to compensate imposed on the tortfeasor. Compensation 
is dissuasive because it seeks to avoid the possibility of the trans-
gressor carrying out further harm. At the same time, it may have an 
exemplary effect for other potential transgressors.70 It is possible to 
perceive this dissuasive effect from the way in which the general 
clauses for tort liability are worded. From the beginning, they al-
ready pose a threat for those who cause any damages: compensation. 
However, deterrence can be viewed either from an ex ante or an 
ex post perspective. Faure points out that from an ex ante perspec-
tive, tort liability can be understood as an instrument that guides the 
behavior of people who could be involved in an accident.71 But from 
an ex post perspective, in Gilead’s opinion, that deterrence can be 
understood as the solution proposed by tort law to the problem posed 
by the economic distortion triggered by the externalities caused by 
                                                                                                             
 70. H. BEAU BAEZ III, TORT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (2d ed., Kluwer 
2014). 
 71. Michael Faure, Tort Liability in France: An Introductory Economic Anal-
ysis, in 6 LAW AND ECONOMICS IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES 169-81 (Bruno Deffains 
& Thierry Kirat eds., JAI 2001). 
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the injuries or losses suffered.72 Nevertheless, it is also possible to 
find legal authors who believe that this ex post effect is precisely 
what makes tort law ineffective from a preventive point of view.73 
This is something one can easily agree with because, in order to 
claim any kind of compensation, the harm suffered may be current 
or future, but inevitably, it must be true. And besides that, this fact 
has to be proven in court.74 
Having said that, there is a possibility contained in these codes 
that can actually have a real preventive effect: the inhibitory ac-
tion.75 This inhibitory action can be admitted simultaneously with a 
tort liability action. Art. 479 of the Guatemalan Civil Code, art. 1680 
of the Nicaraguan Civil Code, art. 405 of the Costa Rican Civil 
Code, and art. 569 of the Panamanian Civil Code contain almost 
identical regulations to the art. 590 of the Spanish Civil Code where 
this solution has already been tried. In the case of art. 858 of the 
Salvadorian Civil Code and art. 835 of the Honduran Civil Code, 
the wording varies a little, but the spirit is the same: to avoid the 
causation of harm. 
This inhibitory action is a very broad figure that, according 
to Llamas Pombo, complies with a triple function: injunction, pre-
caution, and compensation. Its taxative nature can be used not only 
to request the cessation of nuisances, but actually for all types of 
                                                                                                             
 72. Israel Gilead, Harm Screening Under Negligence Law, in EMERGING 
ISSUES IN TORT LAW 264 (Jason W. Neyers, Erika Chamberlain, & Stephen G. A. 
Pitel eds., Hart 2007). 
 73. Katja Fach Gómez, Acciones preventivas en supuestos de contaminación 
transfronteriza y aplicabilidad del artículo 5.3 Convenio de Bruselas, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPARECHTLICHE STUDIEN (ZEUS) 583, 590 (1999). 
 74. Elena Vicente Domingo, Capítulo III. El Daño, in I TRATADO DE 
RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL, supra note 16, at 330-331. 
 75. Llamas Pombo defines the inhibitory action as an order or injunction is-
sued by the court at the request of an individual who believes or fears that harm 
could be inflicted, or when harm has already been inflicted, that it could be re-
peated, continued, or worsened. The injunction is addressed to the individual that 
is able to avoid such results, by adopting certain preventive behaviors, or by re-
fraining from carrying out activities that could generate such negative results. See 
Eugenio Llamas Pombo, La tutela inhibitoria del daño (la otra manifestación del 
derecho de daños), in V.V. A.A. II ESTUDIOS JURÍDICOS EN HOMENAJE AL 
PROFESOR LUIS DIEZ-PICAZO 2217 (Thomson 2003). 
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risky activities that meet the description found in the law. These pro-
visions might be the only real option for a preventive effect that one 
could find in Central American tort law. The features required by 
regulation in order to apply this solution are (a) the menace of injury 
towards a legally protected interest; (b) an unlawful behavior; (c) a 
causal link between an action or omission and the actual damage; 
and (d) a material possibility of avoiding the causation of an actual 
damage.76 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Undoubtedly, tort law is one of the fundamental elements of any 
legal system. The very specific purpose of granting the reparation 
for the injustices caused by the effects of harmful activities is 
enough justification for such qualification. Nevertheless, the way its 
solutions are devised will determine tort law’s real possibilities.  
Traditionally, tort law has required evidence of fault or negli-
gence in order to grant compensation for any wrongdoing. Evidence 
of causation between the action and the harmful effects has also been 
required. Nevertheless, industrialization and technological develop-
ment have imposed a burden on these legal systems, forcing them to 
provide adequate solutions for the new risks facing humankind. 
From the perspective of tort law, this has meant an evolution from 
the traditional idea of penalizing negligence or fault to the protection 
of the legal interests, and thereby, the equitable compensation of the 
victims. This shift from corrective to distributive justice, from im-
putation to equity and deterrence, has also taken place in the Central 
American civil codes.  
However, this evolution has proved to be slow, meaning that 
some very traditional features of the way civil law has approached 
tort liability are still available in these codes. For example, they all 
use a general clause system in order to define tort liability, although 
in the case of Guatemala, this clause is rather ample. The wording 
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used describes not only fault and negligence based liability but strict 
liability as well.  
Having said that, the evolution undergone by Central American 
civil law is evident when it is possible to find in these codes the use 
of pseudo-objective criteria in order to characterize tort liability. 
Once again, the Guatemalan Civil Code is the one that offers a very 
particular approach, resorting to a general rebuttable presumption of 
fault. Nonetheless, this evolution has not stopped there. Strict liabil-
ity has also been integrated in some of these codes, except the Nic-
araguan Civil Code, especially through the application of principles 
such as ubi emolumentum, ibi onus and res ipsa loquitur. In El Sal-
vador, strict liability is used when establishing responsibility for the 
acts of things. Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama have integrated 
this solution in an ampler way, but the Guatemalan Civil Code has 
the strongest commitment with this modern take on torts.  
Besides the need to harmonize the way these civil codes ap-
proach strict liability, there are still some pending issues, such as the 
recognition of possible unlawful effects of lawful deeds or activities. 
None of these civil codes explicitly regulates this possibility. Only 
the Costa Rican jurisprudence has recognized it. Unlawfulness 
needs to be recognized and regulated as a feature of tort liability in 
order to alert judges that even acting with a lawful behavior is not a 
free pass and that even lawful deeds may entail responsibility. This 
gap has been somehow resolved in Guatemala and Costa Rica by 
including in the civil codes the doctrine of abuse of rights, although 
it is not exactly equivalent. Nicaragua and Panama are not that far 
behind, since their jurisprudence has already established the applica-
bility of this doctrine as well. Nevertheless, Honduras and El Salva-
dor still need to address this gap. 
It is evident from this first approach that there is still a long way 
to go in order to achieve some level of harmonization regarding tort 
liability models. The national lawmakers have their work cut out for 
them in order to provide the users of these legal systems adequate 
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tools to face the challenges of the undergoing economic integration 
process.  
 
 
